There has been an interesting and significant shift over the years in mens' views on the potential science has for indefinite further development.
In the heyday of Newtonian science, it seemed as though the basic groundplan of the universe had already been discovered; more would be added doubtless, but the essentials the laws governing the motions of the smallest particles-were definitively known (it was supposed) and the future could only appear as postscript. With the eclipse of Newtonian certitudes at the beginning of this century, a quite different view arose, one which proposed an unlimited future for science. Two factors contributed especially to this change. One was the growth of atomic physics, culminating in quantum theory, which suggested that physics could progress indefinitely by finding ever finer structures within structures to account for the endlessly diverse properties of things. The other via: the replacement of Newtonian mechanics by relativistic mechanics, which destroyed the myth of a basic "core" science, immutable once formulated.
added to only by accretion. In the new perspective, it was clear that no theory, especially not the most basic one, mechanics, could ever become immune to fundamental revision. Indeed, one ought to expect that the future of physics would lie in an endless conceptual reconstruction, in which the entire structure would periodically be reshaped.
Over the last fifty years, then, it has gradually come to be assumed that the horizons of science are essentially unlimited, that it can continue to develop for a hundred, a thousand, ten thousand , years in a continuous and progressive fashion, never arriving at an irrevisable "complete" theory in any domain, yet never on the other hand facing fundamental barriers to further progress. Thus while the Newtonian-Kantian ideal of a synthetic a priori "pure" physics was given up, it was still assumed that one could (and would) continuously approach the science which would totally disclose the structures of the real. No longer did these structures yield themselves to the easy and definitive insight that both Greek and "classical"
(pre-1900) modern science had hoped for. But there did not seem at first sight to be any reason why, given enough time, as near an approximation as one wished to such a definitive insight might not be attainable.
This hope has not been ruled out. But in recent decades, some troublesome doubts have arisen, some yet-distant clouds have come in view on the horizon. In this essay, the most important of these will be briefly discussed.
It is important to grasp in what sense the possible barriers to the optimistic program of an indefinitely developing science are proposed here as "barriers". It is not the case that any of them, or all of them together , suggest that science is approaching a definite limit . Rather, what are listed here are signals that warn us against the too-easy optimism of yesteryear . The future development of science could be limited, they would suggest , although it is too early yet to say where the limits (if they do appear) will be .
The conclusion of our inquiry, let it be noted from the start, is not that the future of science can be shown to be limited in specifiable ways, but rather that it is unwarranted to assume (as has too easily been assumed, both in classical and in recent science, though from different standpoints) that it cannot be limited, i.e. that the entirety of the real is, in principle, transparent to systematic scientific inquiry.
1 The Godel Theorem
Before we get to natural science, let us glance at one stunning "set-back" in mathematics, the well-known Godel theorem (1931):
To those who were able to read Godel's paper with understanding, its conclusions came as an astounding and melancholy revelation. Even more unexpected was the discovery that the completeness of such a system cannot be proved either, which means that no matter how we axiomatize a formal system, there will always be "true" statements in the domain of that system which cannot be derived from the axiom-set chosen.
1) This essay is an abbreviated and revised form of a longer article : "Limits of scientific enquiry" published in Science and the Modern World, ed. J. C. Steinhardt, Plenum Press, New York, 1966 . Since then Richard Schlegel has touched on many of these same issues from a rather different point of view in his thoughtprovoking book, Completeness in Science, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966. 2) Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman, "Godel's proof", in The World of Mathematics, ed. J. R. Newman, New York : Simon and Schuster, 1956, vol. 3, p. 1669. There is thus a radical barrier to complete axiomatization; the equating of mathematical truth with deducibility from a specifiable axiom-set is no longer possible.
Here, then, is a unique limitation, and in that domain-mathematicswhere limitations might least be expected. For in mathematics we might seem to be dealing with a wholly exhaustible construction, something that could be fully explored and specified by us since it is our construction. could not but be consistent. But now that such criteria are discarded, and the intuition is set free, as it were, the danger of antinomy is far greater.
For the "new" mathematics, "Godel's theorem spelt nothing less than a disaster. The single criterion retained by the "new" mathematician is shown to be forever incapable of decisive application in any system of interest.
This does not mean that mathematical research is blocked, or even made more difficult. Rather it shows that in this conception of "mathematics,"
certain highly desirable goals are permanently out of reach. always known that we cannot reach out to the past, though it reaches out to us. It now seems that even our present is more limited than we had realized; there are unimaginable abysses that we cannot reach and that cannot send any message to us. The science-fiction writers cheat when they put their spaceships in "overdrive" or use their "space-warp" to overcome the harsh reality that makes the nearest star four years of travel away, even if we are to travel at the maximum speed that (so far we know) any physical reality can, i.e., that of light.
Looking in the other direction, towards the very small, another sort of problem is emerging. The experimental probing of the nucleus takes vast quantities of concentrated energy. As we go downwards in scale, stability is greater, and it becomes more and more difficult to separate constituents.
The macroscopic effects of atomic structure (color, melting point, etc.) can all (or nearly all) be explained without going further in the structuring of the atom than the nucleus. The evidence that allows us to go further than this and ask about electron or nucleon structure is itself of a highly sophisticated kind; it is produced by our machines, and only occasionally by such "natural" events as cosmic rays. As time goes on and machines get bigger and more complex, questions arise about the focusing of energy on tiny areas, and it is obvious that such focusing cannot be indefinitely improved. There is a limit to the amount of energy available, and to the means by which we can bring it to bear. It is not a sharp limit, of course, but it does remind us that the picture of physicists probing ever deeper into the worlds within worlds runs into problems at the very first step :
getting the data.
A better-known limit is that furnished by the quantum uncertainty principle. This principle has many formulations, but they reduce to two.
One relies upon an analysis of measurement and the interaction it neces-sarily causes. Because of the "granular" structure of this interaction (symbolized by Planck's constant, h), it can never be exactly calculated, and so every measurement, at any level, is accompanied by a disturbance to previously known parameters of the system, one whose amount cannot be exactly calculated. The other form of the principle is more fundamental, and is rooted in the quantum formalism governing the state-description of subatomic entities. Because the parameters are mathematically noncommuting, certain pairs of them cannot be sharply defined or predicated. If one is dealing with an ensemble, this causes no problem because perfectly definite statistical descriptions and predictions can be given. But if one is trying to handle an individual case, quite basic uncertainties arise. For instance, the quantum state-description of a radium atom could never, even in principle, tell us exactly when the atom would disintegrate. It could only give a probability distribution, at best.
At first sight, it might seem as though this was simply a weakness of the formalism; after all, it has always been true that a given theory could not handle all the "fine-structure" problems presented to it. When quantum theory is incorporated (as all theories ultimately are, it would seem) in a wider formalism, why should the new theory not be able to give a more exact acount of such things as the decay of individual radium atoms? In the forty years since Heisenberg, Bohr, and Dirac first proposed their uncertainty principle, this question has given rise to continuing controversy, and there is still no agreement as to how it should be answered. The "Copenhagen" group from the beginning took their discovery to have a sort of ontological significance. The "uncertainty" in the theory mirrored a real "indeterminism" in nature . It is quite striking to note that this interpretation, which ran so violently counter to the whole spirit of Newtonian Without taking sides in the Bohr-Bohm controversy, then, it is still possible to note one very important consequence for our theme. Classical physics assumed complete predictability in principle; in practice, it was not always attainable, but it was always believed to be available, given enough time. This is no longer the case. We simply do not know whether the physics of the future will restore complete predictability, even at the level of such relatively large-scale events as atomic disintegrations. It may do so or it may not. We do not yet have the "Godel theorem" of quantum theory that Von Neumann's proof for a long time was believed to be, i.e., a proof of the impossibility of finding a theory that would restore complete predictability. But leaving aside the fact that the majority of contemporary Western physicists appear to believe (without any really satisfactory proof)
that such a theory never will be found, it is most important to recognize that they may be right i.e., the present quantum uncertainty may very well turn out to be a permanent barrier to complete predictability, a feature of all future theories. We cannot be sure, but there are indications that it is quite possible.
Once agan, if this be the case, it is not that present theory has exhausted the physical reality, but rather that it has said all that theory is able to say, even though there is much more that one would want it to say.
•˜3 some of these, and spectacular progress, not only in learning theory, but also in its practical applications, seems right around the corner. But with all of this, the pace of learning is still finite, and so is the human life-span.
The creative years of a scientist are short, but already the paths to the frontier are dangerously lengthening.
It is possible to plan educational short-cuts, to drop whole areas and get quickly to areas of contemporary concern. But because scientific knowledge develops mainly by adding new "vertical" layers rather than by making "horizontal" forays h ere and there, this kind of condensation is possible only up to a point. One can omit classical theories of elasticity, for example, in teaching a student quantum electrodynamics, but one could not omit classical dynamics entirely, or else the student will not really understand. To understand complex theories like general realtivity theory, a great deal of prior work on vectors and tensors, on dynamical explanation, is indispensable. In a certain sense, the mind has to recapitulate the history of the theory, up to a point at least, in coming to understand it fully. This is especially true if he is not just to understand it, but to play a role in developing it further. The creative mind has to break the rules, make unexpected connections, but to do this a thorough grasp of the rules (and a feel for how they have been "broken" in the past) is required .
It is already the case in domains like physics that experts are completely out of sight of one another, each busy in his own excavation, the sounds of digging in other excavations quite muffled by distance. They will not know each other's theories, though they still can as a rule understand them if they make a great effort. But life is short and effort is precious, and the Physical Review keeps doubling in size. Each year hundreds of thousands of papers in physics are published; several thousands of them are likely to be directly relevant to any given area of concern. It is not enough to gesture optimistically to the computer. One of the reasons why more do not is surely the strong, almost overpowering, motivation the student must have in order to take upon himself this kind of isolated absolute effort, so unlike anything his more easygoing neighbor has to encounter. The demand for such effort comes especially in late adolescence and early manhood, and it is just at that period that the student of today finds himself increasingly under emotional pressure from a society which in so many ways challenges and dissipates intellectual effort.
Some of the motivation impelling students who take on the years of preparation necessary for advanced work in today's science surely comes from the strong feeling that science can make over the world and relieve its wants. As these wants come more and more to be fulfilled, and science goes off along less immediately serviceable ways (to the moon, for example), will the motivation hold up? The good physics student feels from the beginning of his work something of the excitement that has urged men onwards to know ever since the first astronomers left their warm beds for lonely hours of bleary-eyed measurement. But as physics becomes more abstruse and the moving frontier further off, will this continue to be so?
It is not at all clear that it will and creativity in such a case may not answer the command of government to carry the curve of scientific research upward to new and more distant heights.
•˜ 4 Analogy and Discovery
Scientific progress is dependent most of all upon the imagination of individual scientists. In conclusion, then, it may be well to take a hard look at the conditions of scientific discovery, and to ask whether any of them suggests a built-in limitation. Discovery in physical science has not been just of one kind, one can disocver all sorts of things: facts, hypotheses, regularities, concepts; the notion of discovery itself is rather different in each case. To discover a regularity in a set of data, it might be enough to run the data through a computer, though there will of course be elements of personal decision in the choice of data and in the definition of curve criteria to be programed into the computer in advance. Even in the discovery of empirical regularities, then, rule-bound mathematical formalisms play the role of necessary condition, never sufficient condition. Non-mathematical unformalized skills and insight, oriented specifically to the physical order and trained by years of familiarity with that order, will be needed in the discovery of even the simplest physical law. This is even more true of discovery in the realm of hyptothesis and concept. Newton's great achievement was not just to discover novel numerical correlations, but to construct a network of complex physical concepts (mass, acceleration, force... ). The syntax of this network was provided by the differential calculus, but its reference to the physical order, that which made it physics rather than mathematics, was of a far more complex kind. The concepts he used had already a physical meaning of sorts given by ordinary usage. Guided by these meanings, he provided an operational linkage between the conceptual system as a whole and the data of measurement. The analogies leading him from the traditional philosophical concept of matter to his own quasi-operational concept of mass were of a specifically physical sort.
Since this is a cruical point, let us press it a little more closely. A purely formal system is a dead system; it has no resources for further development, since the symols are defined exclusively in terms of their internal relations with one another. There is no dynamism, nothing that will force a change. Only some sort of "surplus value" in the meanings of the terms can guide significant development.
Where the system is a mathematical one, the terms have a "surplus value" deriving originally from the experience of multiplicity, space, and the like, but now developed to a far more sophisticated level. F. van Rootselaar, 1968, Vol. 3, pp. 385-396 . yond" that must be emphasized, as well as the intrinsic resources that the model seems to bring to the aid of discovery. When Sommerfeld was trying to explain some second-order effect in the hydrogen spectrum, he modified the .original circular orbit proposed by Bohr and made it elliptical, thus accounting for the anomalous results. Had he merely taken Bohr's theory as a mathematical formalism, there would have been no reason to try this hypothesis. Instead, he saw the electron orbit as an approximation to physical reality, and this led him to regard the electron as an individual entity in a definite orbital path. Another example of a fruitful sort of model is by the notion of spin which has guided so many of the fundamental discoveries in quantum theory.
If our thesis is correct (i.e., that models and concepts with a root-sense in experience have played a central part in past scientific discovery), then it may well be that the most threatening barrier to the future of scientific enquiry lies right here. As our theories move further into the very large and the very small, their anchorage in our familiar middle-sized experience becomes less and less secure. We are forced to modify them in ways that seem paradoxical: we have to combine the metaphor of "wave" (periodic transmission) with that of "particle" (discrete interaction) in order to understand quantum theory, for example. The structural and dynamic metaphors whose roots of meaning (and thus whose "surplus value") lie in the world of perception gradually thin out as we descend into the world of the nucleus. If one looks at recent fundamental particle theory, one is immediately struck by its almost purely mathematical character. Physics has always used mathematics but this is different. Newton used the differential calculus as a convenient syntax, but the weight of his system lay, as we have seen, in its crucial physical concepts, mass and force. Though a numerical measure of mass was possible, the concept itself could not be defined in mathematical terms : its "home", the locus of its "surplus value", was in the physical world. But nowadays physicists use group theory not just as syntax, but almost as carrying its own semantics as well. Calculus did not tell us how planets would move (until we had made some crucial physical assumptions about force), but group theory is almost expected to provide us with a theory of fundamental particles, unaided. It is clear that the "surplus value" at the frontiers of nuclear research today lies much more in mathematics than in physics.
It is also clear that discovery becomes progressively more difficult at this remote level. The traditional source of "surplus value" is drying up, and physicists have to fall back more and more on the reserves of mathematics. They have always had these reserves at their disposal. But they had more, much more, and it was from these nonmathematical reserves that most of the historic discoveries of science have proceeded. Our query is, now clear: Can we be assured that the resources of mathematics alone will be sufficient to carry physical enquiry, as properly physical concepts and science. There just might be things worth knowing that man will never know.
